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 This paper argues for seeing African land tenure regimes as institutional configurations that 
been defined and redefined as part of state-building projects. Land regimes have built state 
authority in the rural areas, fixed populations in rural territories, and organized rural society 
into political collectivities subject to central control. Land tenure regimes can be understood as 
varying across subnational jurisdictions (rather than as invariant across space) in ways that can 
be grasped in terms of a conceptual distinction between neocustomary and statist forms (rather 
than as infinitely diverse). Differences between the two have implications for the character of 
political authority in the rural areas, the nature of political identities and community structure, 
and the nature of property and land claims.  These political effects are visible in differences in the 
forms of local protest and resistance to commercial land acquisitions in periurban Kumasi, 
Ghana, where a neocustomary land regime prevails, and the Kiru Valley of northern Tanzania, 







 The prevalence of land-related political conflict in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
today is often very poorly understood.  Conflict is often explained as failure of the state to 
penetrate the rural areas. Much discussion of land conflict conveys the impression that natural-
resource disputes in Africa stem from the weakness (or absence) of state intervention in rural 
property relations. Yet in many cases, this is clearly not so. Some of the most extensive episodes 
of conflict over land and property rights, including violent conflict, have happened in farming and 
pastoral zones marked by long histories of deep state involvement in the ordering and reordering 
of rural property relations. Since the 1990s, highly politicized land conflict has played out in 
some of the most intensively governed regions of Africa’s strongest states -- some examples are 
the Rift Valley of Kenya, rural Rwanda, North Kivu in DRC, Zimbabwe's commercial areas, and 
southern Côte d'Ivoire.  These cases underscore the need for more comparative and more political 
theories of land tenure regimes and rural conflict.  
 Mamdani (1996), Munro (1998), Lentz (2013) and others have insisted that African land 
tenure regimes be viewed as institutional configurations that have been molded and remolded by 
colonial and postcolonial governments in efforts to extend state power in the rural areas.  They 
show that existing  land tenure regimes bear the heavy imprint of the modern state, even if they 
are often not entirely defined by states, and that rural land regimes go far in structuring the 
political relationships that link rural communities to the state.  
 This paper builds upon this work by advancing two propositions.1 The first is that African 
land regimes vary greatly across space, and that as a first cut, critical differences can be captured 
                         
1 An earlier version was presented at the Kampala 14-16 October 2013 workshop on "Authority, 
territory, community: Regional dynamics of water, land tenure regimes, and state formation in 
Africa," organized by the Nordic Africa Institute.  Thanks to the workshop organizers and 
participants. The field research that went into this paper was conducted with the help of Lydia 
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in two different models of rural land tenure, a neocustomary model and a statist model.  The 
"neocustomary land regimes" referred to here are the land regimes in which state-backed local 
leaders who are officially recognized as neocustomary or traditional exercise state-sanctioned 
authority within communities recognized as autochthonous or indigenous by the state, including 
authority over land allocations and land-dispute adjudication.  Under "statist land regimes," by 
contrast, the central state itself is the land allocator and dispute adjudicator.  This analytic 
framework is crude and schematic:  in actuality, local land regimes often mix or combine these 
different sorts of rules, or display other ambiguities or hybridities.  Nevertheless, this schematic 
model of variation in land regimes captures critical differences in the forms of authority and 
political identities that structure smallholders' access to land.   
 The second proposition is that differences that are captured in this neocustomary-statist 
distinction can help account for patterned variations in the structure and political character of 
land-related competition and conflict.  This paper illustrates this proposition by contrasting local 
responses to large scale land acquisitions in 2009-2010, in two places with land regimes that 
exemplify the schematic distinction between the neocustomary and the statist. The first is the 
Kumasi region of central Ghana, where a strong neocustomary land tenure regime structured local 
resistance and responses to outsiders' acquisition of 400 ha. of prime farmland for a huge 
infrastructural project, the "inland port" at Boankra.  The second is the Kiru Valley in Babati 
District of Manyara Region in northern Tanzania, where a statist land regime structured local 
famers' responses to the state's granting of large tracts of land to promoters of commercial sugar 
cane estates.  Two dimensions of the land tenure regimes prove to be particularly salient in 
shaping the political character of the land-related conflicts examined in this paper.  The first is 
how land regimes define the locus of authority over the allocation of land rights (local versus 
central state).  The second has to do with how local jurisdictions are nested into national 
                                                                         
Nyeme, who holds a MSc in Natural Resource Management from the University of Dar es 
Salaam, and Desmond Koduah, who holds an MSc from the University of Legon, Accra, Ghana.  
It draws also upon Boone 2012, 2014, and in press.  
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institutional structure (either as quasi self-governing ethnic/neocustomary jurisdictions, as in the 
Asante region of Ghana, or as local instances of the national state apparatus, as in Tanzania's Kiru 
Valley).2    
 Differences in land tenure regimes that prove to be key in the case study analysis can be 
understood in terms of the basic, structural differences between neocustomary and statist land 
tenure institutions.  Part I of the paper draws out these general distinctions contrasts.  In Africa, 
these institutional forms were introduced by the European colonial regimes.  Postcolonial 
governments, including Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments, have actively refined or modified 
inherited land institutions in response to their own political needs and logics.  The typological 
distinction between neocustomary and statist land institutions remains as salient and analytically 
useful in describing postcolonial land tenure regimes, however, and postcolonial continuities in 
institutional form are striking in most parts of most countries.  Part II presents the contrasting 
case studies.  Changes in political-economic context over the course of the last few decades, 
especially rising pressure on the land and heightening tensions between commercial investors and 
smallholders, are fueling a new era of land politics and land-related conflict.  These new 
pressures are mediated through very different land tenure regimes -- that is, different relations of 
authority, identity, and territory -- in our two cases.   The analysis shows that institutional 
variations give rise to very different kinds of land politics. A conclusion draws some larger 
implications for thinking about institutionalized political authority in Africa, and how it shapes 
the scale and character of politics.  
 
I.    Land Regimes and State-Building: Two Models 
                         
2 There is another salient dimension of variation that is not explored in this paper.  It is the 
dimension of the land regime that defines citizenship rights and thus, who has the right to access 
land.  For a discussion of citizenship rights that extends this analytic framework, see work cited in 
note 1.  
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 Today's land tenure regimes have been shaped decisively by the efforts of rulers, both 
colonial and postcolonial, to project authority over territory and to govern rural populations.  
Colonial rulers designed land institutions that defined administrative and political jurisdictions at 
the lowest levels of state apparatus.  Authority-based controls over land were codified and 
institutionalized to define local relations of authority and property, and to shape politically-salient 
local identities. Independent governments in Africa have also exploited the ways in which 
authority over land can be deployed to gather power over people, and to structure and incentivize 
their political behavior.  
 Colonial rulers states claimed ownership or trusteeship of all land in the African 
territories. Where they wanted to use and exploit land directly (for urban development, 
government installations, mining, and the settlement of European farmers or ranchers), colonial 
authorities usually expropriated African landholders and users. In these places, farmers or 
pastoralists were forcibly expelled from their ancestral areas or from lands they claimed by other 
rights. Colonial states proceeded to allocate land access to users directly, either arbitrarily or 
under statute, institutionalizing the statist land tenure regimes.  
 Across most of Africa, however, colonial rulers did not seek to assert direct political 
control over the land. Rather, they sought to craft land tenure institutions that would further their 
basic political objectives of keeping most of the population in the rural areas; limiting mobility by 
fixing populations in territories designated as ethnic homelands; and solidifying structures of 
political control that would ward off revolt, uprisings, and rebellion. To these ends, colonizers 
sought to take advantage of and accentuate mechanisms of social control that existed (or were 
presumed to exist) in “African tribal society.”  Institutionalizing the neocustomary land tenure 
regimes was the main instrument for doing this.  
 The neocustomary land tenure regimes were less costly to erect and enforce than the 
more intrusive and overtly coercive statist land regimes. After the Second World War, the 
indirect-rule logic embodied in the neocustomary land regimes was colonizers’ preferred 
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institutional choice across almost all sub-Saharan Africa—that is, wherever countervailing 
considerations did not create rationales for imposing the more costly (in terms of administration 
and coercion) statist land regimes. Their successors, the postcolonial governments, have modified 
these institutional configurations, but their efforts and initiatives have been guided by similar 
state-building logics and constraints.  Continuities in actual institutional form are striking in most 
places.  
 
A.  The Neocustomary Land Regimes 
 In most of colonial sub-Saharan Africa, colonial authorities’ interest in land tenure 
flowed largely from their interest in establishing and enforcing authority over rural people.3 Rules 
of land access were set to establish hierarchical relationships between collaborating African elites 
and their subjects. Although “some of the organizing concepts of precolonial land tenure systems 
continued to influence evolving patterns of land control” (Berry 1988, 58), state-recognized 
chiefs and the male elders or lineage heads who were often designated as their advisers were 
given wide powers to make up what colonialism recognized as customary land tenure. They used 
these prerogatives to extend their authority (and their landholdings).  
 Land powers gave the local authorities recognized by the colonial state carrots and sticks 
that they used to govern their rural subjects. Neocustomary rulers had the power to allocate 
unoccupied land; seize and reallocate land deemed not in use; cede land to the central government 
or at its behest; seize land they deemed needed for communal purposes; seize the land of people 
who did not pay taxes, fines, meet the corvée, or submit to conscription; force widows and 
divorced women to turn over land to their in-laws; force younger men to submit to the discretion 
of elders in deciding land disposition and use; dispose of inheritance cases; rule on other land 
disputes within and among families; authorize transactions or sanction individuals for land 
transactions (such as rentals) not deemed to conform to customary practice as defined by the chief 
                         
3 See Chanock (1998)  
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and elders; and enforce colonial land-use policies (such as forced terracing or destocking). These 
prerogatives were supplemented by powers to tax, conscript, arrest, jail, and mete out justice 
(short of the death penalty). Colonialism’s political and economic institutions thus worked at the 
microlevel to impose and enforce the hierarchy of those who had administrative powers over the 
land, over those who worked the land or needed access to it.   
 With the help of anthropologists, colonial authorities undertook to draw jurisdictions that 
confirmed or expanded the geographic sphere of influence of some (trusted) customary 
authorities and reduced or eliminated the domains of other (often distrusted) local leaders.  These 
new jurisdictions were supposed to be tribal territories encompassing the ancestral homelands of 
the people (grouped into a tribe) who were subject to the authority of the customary (tribal) ruler. 
When reality did not fit the administrative map, reality was often adjusted. Official tribal 
homelands constituted the geographical/territorial arenas for the exercise of customary rulership, 
and the operation of customary courts, land tenure regimes, and citizenship regimes.4  These 
internal boundaries partitioned space, authority, population subgroups, and land. These 
jurisdictions and chiefly hierarchies constituted the basic administrative units and administrative 
machinery (the “local states”) of rural Africa under colonial rule.5 
 Neocustomary land regimes were founded on the principle that land encompassed within 
an officially-recognized ethnic homeland was the endowment of a descent-based community. 
Chiefs or other customary leaders were supposed to manage this corporate endowment on behalf 
of the group. Membership in the descent-based group was thus understood to confer a land 
entitlement.  Land access rules thus imposed a distinction between those who had a land 
entitlement within the ethnic homeland, and those who did not. Insider-outsider distinctions 
became particularly salient where cash-crop production developed in zones of low population 
density -- that is, where in-migrants provided much of the labor to expand the cash-crop 
                         
4 See Young 1994, 232-3.  Groups without officially recognized homelands lost out completely 
and were pressured to “join recognized tribes.” 
5 Mamdani 1996, 21-2.  Lentz 2006 calls this the "native state." 
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economy.  Outsiders or ethnic strangers could gain provisional access to it with the permission of 
certain community members, contingent on acceptance of their politically subordinate status 
within the community (and usually some kind of payment to the rightful landholder). As Painter 
and Philo (1995, 107) put it, customary authority created or reinforced “political system[s] of 
inclusion and exclusion” by stipulating who was considered a full citizen in the customary 
jurisdiction (with political rights and economic rights of membership) and who was not.   
The integrity of neocustomary land tenure regimes as systems for enforcing hierarchical 
authority and the cohesion of descent-based groups rested in large part on the principle of 
nonalienability of land. This is why colonial administrations sought to suppress land sales within 
the chiefly jurisdictions.6 They realized that the development of land markets would undermine 
chiefs’ authority over land and over community members.  The rulers also saw that the 
development of land markets would dissolve the hierarchically-structured descent groups, headed 
by male elders, that they sought to reinforce as the basic landholding unit and the basic political 
unit (Goody 1980, 152). 
African interests also coalesced around the neocustomary land tenure regimes. In rural 
localities, chiefs and members of dominant lineages had a long-term interest in defending their 
political prerogatives over land, even if they also often had short-term interests in strategic sales 
that would generate revenue. At the grassroots level, many smallholders and subordinate 
members of corporate landholding groups developed vested interests in the principle that access 
to land in their ethnic homeland was a birthright recognized (if not always honored) by the state 
(Chanock 1998, 235).   Within extended families and households, the neocustomary structures 
gave senior males authority over land farmed by women and youth, as well as claims to the labor 
of these subordinate household members. 
                         
6 See Phillips 1989; Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006; Rathbone 1993. 
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 Political independence intensified state-building in the farming regions of Africa.  Most 
of the independent African governments sought to tap into the political potential inherent in 
neocustomary land tenure. Whether by constitutional dispensation, law, administrative or 
executive decree, or practice, most governments have confirmed a role for chiefs or other 
autorités traditionneles in allocating access to open land within their jurisdictions, and in 
adjudicating land-related disputes arising over boundaries, inheritance, and transactions. These 
same community-level authorities also often retained the prerogative in allocating access to 
shared resources such as community forests, water points, and pasture.  The notion of customary 
rights also remained politically entrenched in most of rural Africa, where it is wielded for diverse 
purposes by the multiple actors—at all levels of state and society—who have a stake in the 
political prerogatives, protections, and promises it can provide.  
 
B.  The Statist Land Tenure Regimes 
 Within some geographically delimited jurisdictions in every African colony, the state 
made itself the direct allocator, enforcer, and manager of rural land rights.  This is most striking 
in the white settler colonies of Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique, 
where colonial states alienated vast domains from African land users, created separate 
administrative and political institutions to govern these spaces, and assigned rights to arable and 
pasturable land to European settlers or foreign companies for the creation of commercial farms, 
plantations, and ranches.  In some strategic areas of smallholder farming, postcolonial African 
governments also assumed direct authority over land allocation, the management of land use, and 
land-rights adjudication. 
 Both colonial and postcolonial governments have created schemes to resettle African 
populations in new territory, either to clear the way for other forms of land use (including use by 
European settlers or agribusiness), relieve overcrowding in densely populated districts, or 
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establish peasantries on previously unfarmed land.7  Some of the best-known examples of 
postcolonial settlement schemes are found in Kenya, where the government resettled over 
500,000 Kenyan families on Rift Valley farmland in the 1960s and 1970s.  In Côte d’Ivoire, 
75,000 Baoulé displaced by construction of the Kossou Dam in 1970 were resettled by the 
government in the western forest zone of the country.  In postcolonial Rwanda, settlement 
schemes placed tens of thousands of families on marshlands reclaimed by government, or 
pasturelands that had expropriated by the state. Governments have also asserted direct control 
over land for the creation of cities, public works projects, transportation infrastructure, airports, 
ports, agricultural research centers and demonstration farms, military camps,  and landed estates 
that can be given to political elites. They have cordoned off forest reserves, national parks, and 
game preserves, which become off-limits to farmers and, often, most pastoralists as well. 
In such areas, land authority is not devolved to state-recognized customary authorities. 
The central state itself is a direct allocator and manager of land access and use. We refer to this 
type of land control regime as “statist”  to underscore the directness of the state’s role in 
allocating land and, thus, to distinguish this mode of land governance from the indirect rule 
arrangements that define the so-called customary land tenure regimes in Africa.8 
 Under colonialism, forcible displacement of settled farming communities or long-
established pastoralists was a basic tool in the state’s repertoire of techniques of territorial, 
resource, and political control. As Sara Berry has said, “Colonial officials resorted, time and time 
again, to moving people from one location and settling them in another. . . . Displacement was 
commonplace” (Berry 2002, 641).   Forced displacements often involved resettlement or 
                         
7 Amselle (1976, 24) refers to these as movements of rural African populations that were directed, 
oriented, or planned by the state. See Silberfein 1988, 51; Adepoju 1982. 
8 The distinction between customary and statist land regimes blurs in some situations. 
Governments may appoint new chiefs to rule over populations in government-created settlement 
schemes, or state-recognized customary authorities may be pressured by government to settle 
strangers on customary land. Joireman (2011) notes that in the urban slums of Nairobi (on state 
land), the government appoints chiefs as local political authorities.  
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relocation schemes of some sort.9  Often, resettlement was an end in itself. Mafikiri-Tsongo 
(1997) refers to migrations organisées or migrations officielles, wherein states have directed 
movements of rural African populations into new territories to relocate displaced populations or 
to develop new agrarian frontiers.  In Modern Migrations in West Africa (1974), Samir Amin 
referred to such initiatives as state-sponsored movements of agrarian colonization. Receiving 
areas have sometimes been developed as actual settlement schemes in which the state itself built 
roads, demarcated and subdivided settlement areas, and assigned settlers to particular plots of 
land.  
State-sponsored movements of agrarian colonization were promoted to relieve population 
pressure in high-density areas, control disease, increase agricultural production, assert political 
control over rural populations through creation of settled farming communities (the creation of 
peasantries), or clear the way for dams and reservoirs.  Both colonial and postcolonial 
governments encouraged and facilitated the settlement of migrants onto “state controlled agrarian 
frontiers,”10 or “new lands” opened up to smallholder farming by the development of irrigation, 
swamp reclamation, tsetse fly eradication, the drilling of boreholes to create permanent sources of 
water, expulsion of pastoralists, or the abandonment of properties by white settlers.  
Cases in point can be found in discrete subnational territories in virtually all countries of 
Africa -- pockets or zones of statist land tenure exist in countries in which neocustomary tenure 
prevails throughout most of the national territory.  Tanzania stands out as a country in which 
postcolonial rulers have deliberately dismantled neocustomary land tenure institutions throughout 
                         
9 Claassens (2005) comments that even the South African government spoke of “resettlement ... 
of successive waves of people after forced removal from ‘white’ South Africa.” 
10 Médard (2009, 342) uses this term. Some situations are difficult to classify in terms of the 
schema proposed here.  For example, there are situations in which the pax coloniale opened 
agricultural frontiers that were then “colonized” or repopulated by African settlers, but in which 
the state itself did not assert control over the settlement process. See Shack and Skinner 1978.  
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virtually all of the national space.  The state-led uprooting and resettlement of over half of the 
rural population under the Ujamaa policies in the 1970s was a decisive phase in this process.11 
 In these situations, it is the state that regulates land access and land rights. The existing 
ancestral claims to land rights in zones of state-sponsored or enforced in-migration have 
sometimes been “fully extinguished” by formal decree of state authorities. Often, central 
authorities have simply not recognized ancestral claims or established user rights, thus giving 
practical meaning to the principle that a property right not honored by the state is no property 
right at all. There are places where prior users’ ancestral rights have been subordinated, in the 
eyes of the state, to settlers’ land-access rights, which are granted and guaranteed by the central 
state. This may make the ethnic insiders, or autochthones, “involuntary hosts of uninvited 
guests.” 12 At the extreme, they may believe that they have been expropriated outright by the state 
and its clients. Settlers, for their part, are vulnerable if the state withdraws its protection. 
Statist land tenure regimes create structures and relationships of political control over 
farmers that differ greatly from those prevailing under the (neo)customary land tenure regimes.  
Terms of land access draw them into direct relation to the state, rather than one that is mediated 
by neocustomary authorities or the collectivities they are supposed to represent, as is the case in 
the neocustomary land regimes.  Under these conditions, membership in an ethnic group may 
well have no salience in the land-tenure relationship. In-migrants are beholden to the central state 
for land access, rather than to a customary chief, local landlord, or other indigenous host.  The 
relation of on-going dependency upon or exposure to state actions finds legal expression in the 
fact that farmers on smallholder settlement schemes have rarely received negotiable titles to their 
land.  Land disputes and adjudication are mediated through the administrative and political organs 
of state, rather than through neocustomary institutions.  The statist land tenure regimes work to 
                         
11 Boone and Nyeme (in press).  
12 Shack and Skinner 1978, 5. 
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define the land-user a subject (and potentially a citizen, in the best circumstances) of the state, 
rather than a member of an ethnic collectivity.   
Just as the customary land regimes have had their stakeholders and defenders among land 
allocators and users, so too have the statist land regimes.  Farmers whose land rights have been 
granted directly by state authorities, without appeal to the customary land regimes, have a vested 
stake in the central government's authority to allocate land, and in the national principle that 
citizens have a right to settle and farm anywhere in the country.  
 
C. Destabilizating the postcolonial land tenure regimes  
  
 Postcolonial governments in Africa have crafted land tenure regimes that give political 
authorities -- be they of the neocustomary or statist type -- a direct role in mediating land access 
and land dispute adjudication for smallholder farmers.  These institutional configurations serve as 
the basic political infrastructure by which rural Africa is governed.  Both the neocustomary and 
statist land regimes can embody a kind of social contract that ties land users to political 
authorities, that defines communities and their relations to the state, and that confers entitlements 
or claims (however provisional, fragile, or inconsistently honored these may prove to be) on land 
users (Boone 2007).  This helps to explain the levels of political and social stability of these 
arrangements achieved in most places for most of the postcolonial period.    
 Over the last generation or so, however, it has become increasing obvious to outside 
observers that sub-Saharan Africa's smallholder land tenure regime are coming under intensifying 
stress as demographic, political, environmental, and economic conditions are changing.  This is 
especially clear in in the post-1990 period, when several difference sources of pressure on the 
land have coalesced to produce land scarcity for smallholders. Closing of the land frontier, rising 
land values, rising populations, environmental change, and the changing structure of agricultural 
commodity markets have all worked to destabilize social and political relationships around land 
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that were institutionalized in earlier eras. In some places, structural adjustment policies and the 
return to multipartism have also had destabilizing effects. Donor-endorsed or -supported land law 
reform processes now underway in many countries are intended to overwrite the pre-existing 
arrangements, in order to commodify land, free it from social and political encumbrances and 
controls, and invest authority over land-transfer in users and thus remove this prerogative from 
neocustomary authorities and/or the state. 
 The commercial and large-scale land acquisitions that have received a great deal of 
attention since 2008 must be understood against this wider backdrop.13  They are moves toward 
more complete commodification of relations of both land tenure and production.  By definition, 
these deals transfer control over large tracts of land to commercial commercial operators, almost 
always "outsiders" in some sense.  Such land acquisitions may uproot, dispossess, and displace 
farmers, trample upon users' political and historical rights to the land, dissolve community ties, 
and undermine established, land-based political and social hierarchies.   
 Much of the scholarly analysis of "large scale land grabs" has focused on the exclusion of 
smallholders from participation in deal-making, and on the legal, political, and economic forces 
that conspire to severely constrain peasant farmers' and (agro-)pastoralists' abilities to defend 
acquired rights when their lands and pastures are targeted by large-scale, often foreign, investors.  
Yet the commercial land deals that can deprive small-scale land users of access to and control 
over family lands are often deals struck between domestic investors and states.14  In these cases, 
the actors, intermediaries, processes, and mechanisms of deal-making are often very close to 
home, affording land users who are threatened with expropriation or loss of land rights with more 
opportunity to organize protest or even resistance -- that is, opportunity in terms of time, venues 
for exercising "voice," and possibilities for mobilizing allies within the domestic political system.  
                         
13 Cotula	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  de	  Schutter	  2011;	  Vermeulen	  and	  Cotula	  2010.	  	  	  	  
14 Peters 2013, Klopp 2000, Ouédraogo 2006. 
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 In the two situations examined below, this was indeed the case:  small-scale farmers 
sought to defend property entitlements or land rights against domestic investors.  The case 
analyses aim to show that cross-case variation in the nature of the existing land tenure regimes -- 
the Ghana case provides an example of a neocustomary land regime, while the Tanzania case is 
an example of a statist land regime -- produced variation in the ways in which smallholder land 
rights were politicized, advanced, contested, and defended.  In both cases, institutionalized 
political relationships around land defined the authority norms and figures, the political identities, 
and political channels for protest and resistance that were implicated in smallholder resistance to 
land acquisitions by large-scale commercial users.  Contrasts across the two cases go far in 
revealing land tenure institutions' structuring effects on politics. 
 
III.  Local Responses to Land-Scale Land Acquisitions by Outsiders: Contrasting cases    
 
A. Ghana's Inland Port at Boankra (Kumasi) 
 
i. Ashanti Region LTR.  Ghana provides a clear example of deliberate and even muscular 
postcolonial state action to sustain and reproduce neocustomary forms of rule that were 
institutionalized under colonialism.15    
 In what is now the Ashanti Region of Ghana, the British colonial authorities delimited the 
Asante chiefs’ territorial jurisdictions early in the twentieth century. The colonial state codified 
chiefs' powers to allocate, control, and dispose of land within their territorial jurisdictions. The 
institution of stool lands (lands controlled through the Akan chieftaincies) developed as the 
linchpin of British indirect rule. The British realized that chiefly prerogatives over land could be 
                         
15 One example of this is Ghana’s 1992 constitution, which makes chiefs owners and managers of 
stool and skin lands, which are lands attached to the chieftaincy as an institution and supposed to 
held in trust for the members of the collectivity. See Kassanga and Kotey (2001, 1). 
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wielded to restrain the development of land markets, thus allowing the chiefs to retain authority in 
the rural areas, and political leverage over their subjects. 
 These arrangements remain the cornerstone of a postcolonial political and legal 
framework for governing southern Ghana.  It has allowed chiefs to extract tribute, rents, revenue, 
and profits from stool lands and also to accumulate properties on their own account—sometimes in 
favor of and sometimes at the expense of their subjects and the communities they are supposed to 
represent. The ultimate vesting of land in the stools also gives chiefs political leverage over both 
stool citizens and in-migrants within their jurisdictions. Ever since the 1920s, much of the conflict 
over land rights and political authority in southern Ghana has centered on the rights and 
prerogatives of these chiefs.16 National governments, with a few short-lived exceptions, have 
chosen to ally with chiefs and to keep land-related redistributive politics bottled up at the level of 
the chieftaincies. Chiefs remain pivotal in dispute adjudication when conflicts cannot be resolved 
within families, especially in cases of interlineage or interjurisdictional disputes.17  
 In the customary land tenure system that the Ghanaian government has 
institutionalized in Ashanti region, family and lineage land rights are usufruct rights for 
farming. These rights are secure from confiscation by the stool as long as the land is 
dedicated to this use. Lineage rights are not exactly freehold rights in this land tenure 
regime, however: the usufruct is "superimposed" on the a stool's ultimate ownership of 
the land (allodial title), which is recognized in the Ghanaian constitution.  Stools retain 
direct control over all land transactions involving outsiders (noncitizens of the stool), and 
non-agricultural use of lands to which the stool holds allodial title. 
                         
16A World Bank report from the early 2000s estimated that more 80 percent of Ghana's total land 
area is held under some form of customary authority. 
17 Crook (2008,131-2) elaborates:  Chiefs run "'customary courts' for the settlement of land and 
other disputes. Most customary landholders are, therefore, still very much dependent on chiefly 
and local or family institutions to uphold their right of access to land, and for protection against 
unlawful dispossession of their customary landholdings..." 
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 Around the urban fringes of Kumasi (about a forty-kilometer radius from Kumasi 
center), an estimated 98 percent of land in the urban fringes of Kumasi constitutes stool 
land in this ultimate sense.18  By the 1990s, very little of this was vacant communal land 
available to the chiefs to reallocate for farming purposes (as is the case throughout most 
of the old cocoa zone of southern Ghana). Janine Ubink (2008: 157) explains: "Now,.. the 
only way that chiefs can make money from land is to cancel out the usufructuary rights of 
the citizens." In periurban Kumasi, this is what they have done. 
 Chiefs retain power to allocate unused land, and to authorize commercial land leases is 
vested in chiefs.  They also retain power to reclaim land from lineages under certain conditions.  In 
periurban zones such as the region around Kumasi that is the focus of the present analysis, this has 
emerged as a focal point of land conflict between chiefs and citizens of the stools in periurban 
zones.  
 Conversion of farmland to urban uses involves the termination of family and 
usufruct land rights. It is a process that creates clear winners and losers. Hamidu Ibrahim 
Baryeh, a Kumasi Lands Commissioner, did not mince words: "The current situation is a 
free for all affair and the winners are the most powerful in society such as chiefs, 
government officials, and rich men. The losers are the youth, women folk, and the 
disabled; thereby sowing the seeds of instability in the future" (Baryeh 1997, 23). Low-
status lineages are also more vulnerable than more powerful lineages. Dispossessions can 
result in landlessness and homelessness, as Baryeh points out.19 Also lost in many 
(perhaps most) cases is the presumed right of the usufruct holder to give or withhold 
consent and to receive compensation.  
 
                         
18 Baryeh 1997,14-15. 
19 "At Atasamanso it is estimated that 700 people have no place to farm and neither do they 
possess building plots. At Kyerekrom it was estimated that 90% of the adult population were 
landless... 100% due to the urban conversion process." Baryeh 1997, 22. 
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ii. Reclaiming farmland in periurban Kumasi. The city of Kumasi, the regional capital, a fast-
growing city with a population of almost 1.5 million in 2005.20 With the backing of the state, 
chiefs have been able to assert an interpretation of existing law that allows them full discretion 
over the decision to convert farmland to potential urban use, thus annulling the lineages' and 
families' usufruct rights and "merging" the plot with stool land under the direct control of the 
chief (Baryeh 1997). With urban sprawl and suburbanization, much of the roadside and village 
land around periurban Kumasi has become vulnerable to potential conversion. An Assemblyman 
from Ejusu explained it,: "When the town reaches your land, your farm becomes the property of 
the chief."21  
 These processes give rise to land-related conflicts that find expression in ways 
that are largely structured by the prevailing land tenure regime. Land-related conflict 
plays out in the local political arena defined by chieftaincy, is often communitywide in 
scope, and targets the chieftaincy itself. Chieftaincy creates a "public sphere" where 
contestation over loss of land rights can take the form of voice. At issue are the scope and 
limits of chiefly prerogative over land. Do chiefs monopolize the power to decide to 
convert farmland to urban use? Do chiefs monopolize the right to allocate parcels 
designated for potential urban use, and to sell leases to converted land? Do they control 
unilaterally the disposition of revenues so generated, even to the point of simply 
pocketing the funds?  
 Open contestation over the chiefs' land powers takes place both within and 
outside channels institutionalized in the local state that is represented by the stool. Protest 
                         
20 Contestation over the scope of chiefly prerogative in matters concerning timber and mining 
concessions, which pay royalties to the stools, is also prominent.  Berry 2001. 
21Interview, Ejusu-Juaben Assemblyman, 21 July 2009.   Sara Berry explains that if the stool 
asserts eminent domain, the family "has a right to expect compensation" (Berry 2001, 179). See 
also Berry 2013. Lineage lands in Ashanti are often described as held under customary freehold, 
with the caveat that they are difficult to transfer outside the family. However, in periurban 
Kumasi today, chiefs and some local state officials insist that lineage rights are only usufruct 
rights for farming. This represents a narrowing of the meaning of lineage land rights. 
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and resistance takes the form of the contentious politics of public denunciations; 
petitioning; public protests and demonstrations; and highly public attacks on chiefs' 
palaces or other property of theirs (such as cars or plantations) or on the chiefs 
themselves (assaults, chasing away, and so on). Ubink (2008:158 emphasis added) writes 
that "all study villages witnessed various kinds of on-going struggles and negotiations 
between the land-owning chiefs and their people, ranging from direct confrontation with 
the chief [including swearing and shouting at the chief at public village meetings] to 
bringing in other people or agencies, to more evasive techniques to 'get around' the 
chief."  
 
iii.  The Boankra inland port in 2009. The Boankra Inland Port is one of nine "national 
infrastructure projects" designed to help revitalize the domestic and regional economy.  
Development of this rail and road shipping hub would ease pressure on Ghana's existing 
ports, lower costs of transport for land-locked neighbors, rehabilitate the Tema-Kumasi 
rail line, support the development of a new export processing zone in the Kumasi area.  
The Ghana Ports and Harbors Authority and the Ghana Shippers Council acquired 400 
acres of prime, intensively developed farmland in the town of Boankra, near Ejusu, about 
20 miles from Kumasi, capital of Ashanti Region. By 2009, the land had been 
demarcated, enclosed, cleared, and a complex of buildings stood nearly finished and 
nearly ready to be occupied.  Yet forward movement had been stalled by land-related 
conflict, and the search for a new set of outside private investors to partner with the 
national investors who had originally spearheaded the project.  In 2012 "a leading 
Chinese bank" was the most promising among prospective investor. 22 
                         
22 In September 2013 The Chronicle reported that the 140 farmers displaced by the project had 
been compensated, and that another 3.2 billion Cedi had been deposited in the accounts of the 
Kumasi Traditional Council in payment of compensation to the land owners. The Chronicle 
 20 
 Heated controversy over the loss of farmland to the "inland port" infrastructure 
project in Boankra stretched over a more than a decade.  In 2007, those who had lost land 
took over a town meeting in protest. 
At an emotionally charged meeting at the town on December 30th [2007], the 
land owners, clad in red and black attires, hoisted red and black flags in and at 
the entrance of the town and demanded that Nana Abena Afriyie [the 
Queenmother] should cough up the said amount given to her by the Otumfuo [the 
Asantehene] as compensation by the 8th of [January]. They claimed that they 
would make life unbearable for the queenmother if she fails to release the said 
amount by the deadline. The secretary of the land owners association [said they 
would not allow] the Queenmother to rob them in broad daylight. When 
contacted, [the Queenmother]... said the land owners got everything wrong 
because by the dictates of custom, individuals do not own lands and that 
traditional authorities do so on their behalf."23  
 
Ubink (2007, 6) tells of an even more extreme confrontation over the sale of land to build 
a church 2003-04:  
In some villages there have even been large-scale violent uprisings of commoners against 
the chief. For instance in Pekyi No. 2, where the chief sold a large part of the village land 
to the Deeper Life Christian Ministry and then pocketed the money, the commoners 
chased both the chief and the church representatives out of the village, killing one of the 
latter in the process." 
                                                                         
(Accra), 29 Sept. 2013, "Chasing $800 in China," by Sebastian R. Freiku, posted at 
http://thechronicle.com.gh/?p=26325 
23 Ghanaian Journal, "Boankra Inland Port Threatened," Business section, 4 January 2008. 
http://www.theghanaianjournal.com/2008/01/04/boankra-inland-port-threatened/. Accessed 10 
May 2010. 
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Some village communities have sought to appeal a chief's decisions by going up the chiefly 
hierarchy to the Asante Traditional Council or seeking the intervention of the paramount chief, 
and some have threatened chiefs with destoolment.24 Bayreh (1997), the Kumasi Land 
Commissioner, points to a few "best-practice" cases in which villages have successfully 
demanded the creation of Land Allocation Committees to include community representatives in 
decision-making (alongside the chief and elders), but he himself notes that in some localities, 
demands for the creation of such committees have been the subject of hostile confrontations 
between chiefs and local community members.  
 In the Boankra controversy, aggrieved citizens attempted to transcend the 
political parameters imposed by the neocustomary by appealing to agents and institutions 
of the central state. They appealed to the District Assembly, implored the police to 
sanction unlawful behavior, petitioned powerful persons, and demonstrated in front of 
government offices.  Citizens who had lost their land to the Boankra project petitioned 
the Ejusu-Juaben District Assembly (unsuccessfully), took the scandal to the local press, 
and petitioned then-president John Kufuor and the Speaker of Parliament. Yet in Boankra 
as in the cases analyzed by Ubink (2008), the central administration tried to to stay out of 
the case, and the District Assemblies, which are party-representative bodies and local 
instances of the national government, avoided taking action in the dispute. In discussing 
the Boankra case, one Assemblyman in peri-urban Kumasi explained the passive role of 
decentralized local government in land-related conflicts by saying that "the Assembly 
cannot do anything. Anyway, people fear the chiefs."25 Ubink (2007:6, 13-14) argues 
                         
24 Ubink mentions that some village Unit Committees have threatened the chiefs with 
destoolment (Ubink 2008, 159). Some Unit Committees have pushed for the creation of Land 
Allocation Committees or tried to mediate conflicts between chiefs and particular families (as in 
Boankra, for example, field notes July 2009). These are instances of citizens taking advantage of 
the grassroots-level emanations of national representative institutions to try to impose some 
accountability on chiefs and democratize decision-making. 
25 Author's interviews, Besease/Ejusu, 17 July 2009. 
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explicitly that no Ghanaian political party in the current period has attempted to take up 
the issue of land rights, land law reform, or abuse of chiefly authority. According to her, 
the entire Ghanaian central administration adheres to a "policy of non-interference" in 
chiefly affairs, in an attempt to stay on the good side of those who broker land and votes 
at the local level.26  
 In peri-urban Kumasi, struggles over the land-related prerogatives of chieftaincy 
are very difficult to "export" to these other institutional forums.  Partly this is due to the 
narrow political (electoral) incentives of the ruling elite, but it is also the result of a 
national legal system which defends "customary law" as a semi-autonomous realm in 
which the secular courts and legislature exercise limited powers of lawmaking and legal 
interpretation. As Amanor explained it, "while the peasantry is also theoretically 
recognized via its elected representatives in the democratic process, this has limited 
impact on the land question, since land matters are recognized as the preserve of chiefs, 
not elected local councils" (2005, 105). For ordinary citizens, the practical impediments 
to appealing to the courts of the civil administration for redress can also be 
overwhelming, especially in settings where the exercise of power is clearly biased in 
favor of chiefs. 
 
B.  Kiru Valley in Babati District, Manyara Region (northern Tanzania)  
 
 i. Land Tenure in Manyara Region. Land tenure institutions in the farming districts of 
Manyara region of northern Tanzania are exemplary of a "statist" type of land regime.  Here, 
political rules and institutions governing land differ starkly from the neocustomary land regimes 
that prevail throughout most of rural sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 1970s in Tanzania, the 
                         
26 The Ghanaian government’s 1999 land policy framework defines the policy direction of the 
Land Administration Project.  It aims to confirm the land adjudication powers of local-level 
authorities. See Ubink and Amanor 2008. 
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postcolonial state has not offered juridical recognition to ethnicity-based customary land claims, 
and it has not institutionalized the land powers of neocustomary authorities in administrative 
practice.   Rather, the LTR invests land-allocation authority in local political institutions that are 
local instances of the national state (local agents of the ruling party, and village and ward land 
committees) and channel land-related conflicts into secular political institutions and the national 
political arena.27 This statist LTR works to structure settled communities' land claims as 
nationalist, legal, and livelihood claims, or in terms of a race-centered ethnonationalism (black or 
African Tanzanians), rather than as ethnic claims, and into the national political arena via legal, 
party, and administrative institutions.  Land administration is largely secularized and land 
disputes scale-up into the national court system.  There is de jure legal and administrative non-
recognition of ancestral (and ethnic) land rights, and non-recognition of neo-traditional local 
leaders with land powers.   
 Tanzania's statist land tenure regime if the product of legal reform, administrative 
practice, and state-building.  The process of building this secular land regime in Tanzania has 
been punctuated by a series of decisive state initiatives.   
 In the 1920s, the British colonial administration erected an indirect-rule infrastructure of 
customary authority.  Indirect rule in Tanganika had distinctive features that reflected Tanganika's 
"protected" status under a League of Nations trusteeship.  A critical 1923 ordinance (and 1928 
amendment) recognized customary rights of occupancy in established farming areas, and invested 
these in the land user, not the ethnic group.28   The land-user gained a customary (or deemed, 
permissive) right to land after 12 years of undisturbed use.  The 1923 land law would pass 
unchanged into the legal architecture of the new Nyerere government in 1961. 
                         
27 They also dilute the political salience of ethnicity as an axis of political competition, and as an 
overt political discourse for justifying land claims.  See Boone and Nyeme (in press).  
28 "The right of occupany was undoubtedly a lesser interest than English freehold, but a piece of 
proprietary interest in land all the same, guaranteed by statute" (Shivji, Report of the Presidential 
Commission, 1994, 14). 
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 In the immediate wake of independence, the central state removed most chiefs in the rural 
jurisdictions and replaced them with direct state agents. 1967 was the year of the Arusha 
Declaration.  It nationalized most privately owned properties (including most of the 
approximately 2% of Tanzania's land surface that was alienated to Europeans and other foreigners 
under colonial rule) and asserted state control over these properties.  This was followed by the 
Ujamaa period of forced resettlement and expropriation of African-held large landholdings from 
1973/4 to 1976/7.   Ujamaa resettlement cut against customary rights as they had been defined in 
law since the 1920s:  villages were reconfigured, people were relocated into some 8,000 new 
villages, and smallholders were allotted new plots of land for farming.  This process was 
accompanied by the creation of new, local-level political structures: " The reformulated 
community institutions were to be supervised by a parallel system of governmental and party 
bureaucrats, thus effectively eliminating community leaders affiliated with the old colonial 
system.  Land was henceforth available only from party-supervised village councils"  (Williams 
1996, 217-8).  Williams describes this as "a vast administrative apparatus set up to displace 
lineage and neighborhood institutions..." (219-220).   According to Mascarenhas, "villagization 
removed the last vestiges of 'tribal security'" (2000, 70).     
 The statist character of the land tenure regime was further entrenched in the roll-back of 
socialism in 1992.  To protect the state's earlier land reallocations from legal challenge under 
Tanzanian law, the government moved boldly to (retroactively) legally extinguish customary land 
rights to all lands reallocated u 
 This legal moves set the stage for the 1995 National Land Policy, the 1999 Land Act, and 
the 1999 Village Land Act.  The 1999 Acts constituted villages as local-level administrative units 
and territorial jurisdictions.  The Acts made secular, decentralized local government the allocator 
of village lands that are not assigned to an individual.  In Manyara region and many other parts of 
Tanzania, the new political units are often multiethnic and composed of both old inhabitants and 
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ujamaa-era in-migrants.29  The 1999 Land Acts also created a hierarchy of formal land tribunals, 
running from newly-created village land tribunals, to new ward land tribunals, 30 to district level 
land and housing courts, and the national level high court for land which sits in Arusha (with the 
possibility of appeal to supreme court in Dar es Salaam). All levels of this integrated juridical 
hierarchy were linked via the appeal mechanism. 
 The turn to neo-liberal investment policies has deepened the statist character of the land 
tenure regime. Legal arrangements set in place over the course of a almost a century have 
facilitated the alienation of village lands to investors, and the development of commercial land 
transactions throughout much of the national space.  Individuals with registered allotments can 
now rent or lease their land under the Land (Amendment) Act of 2004.  Many observers have 
described this measure as fully commoditizing agricultural land.  
 Over the course of the postcolonial period, the Tanzanian government has built a fully 
statist land regime.  Smallholder property claims have become more secular, better 
institutionalize in the state's legal and administrative structure, more bureaucratized, less 
clientelistic, and more commodified over time. Coupled with the building of legal machinery for 
land adjudication in the 1990s and 2000s, this has produced what Chris Peter (2005)  calls the 
"judicialization of conflict."  Land-related conflict is channeled into the judicial system.31 
  
ii. Kiru Valley.  The Kiru Valley is a well-irrigated, fertile valley in the Babati District of 
Manyara Region (formed with the division of Arusha Region in 2002).  A statist land tenure 
                         
29 A village jurisdiction in Tanzania can cover 100 sq. kms.  
30 The Ward Tribunals Act of 1985 created ward tribunals (Mabaraza ya Kata); the 1999 act 
created separate ward land tribunals.    
31 There is unevenness across space in this process and outcome.  Some partial exceptions seem to 
be areas constituted as reserves for pastoralists, such as the colonial-era Maasai reserve lands.  
Another partial exception could be the micro-homelands of that have long been densely settled, 
such as the Chagga area where there was not much state intervention in the land tenure regime. 
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regime prevails without any traces of (ancestral) or customary claims by settled agriculturalists.32   
Smallholders and large landholders use the national court system intensively.  There is no 
institutionalized customary authority.  Until the 1940s, the Kiru Valley was tse-tse infested and 
inhabited by a small community of hunter-gathers (the Mbugwe) in its northernmost reaches.33  
The colonial government made large-scale land concessions to European settlers.34  With tse-tse 
eradication in the late 1940s, the process took-off, and most land in the Kiru Valley was owned 
by white settlers at the time of independence.  Tanzanians in-migrated from many disparate parts 
of northern and, mostly, central Tanzania to provide farm labor and often were allowed to farm 
small plots of a few acres on their own account, much like the African workers in Kenya's so-
called White Highlands.   
 These large landholdings were expropriated by the state under the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration.  Most of the land was leased by the Tanzania government as large NAFCO (National 
Food Corporation) concessions to foreign companies (mostly for large-scale wheat production).35  
After the economic failure of these ventures and the onset of privatization policies in the 1990s, 
the government -- -- leased these same properties to new investors.  This time, most of the 
investors were Tanzanian citizens of Asian descent.   There were strenuous objections from 
members of the ethnically-heterogeneous communities of African farmers who were, by now, 
long-established in the Kiru Valley, some as squatters of properties abandoned by Europeans 
and/or NAFCO.  
                         
32 There are six large commercial farms and eight registered villages in Kiru Valley, according to 
one of our interviewees (19 July 2011). 
33 A 1934 population map of Tanganika, reproduced in Borjenson (2004, 100) shows no one in 
the Kiru Valley.  
34 George Six, for example, had 2,000 acres just south of Lake Manyara, close to the escarpment 
wall (NTz Info. Forum, Kiru Valley #1296, in www.ntz.info/gen/n01296.html, accessed April 
2011). 
35 Some of the land was used to create registered administrative villages for African Tanzanians 
living in Kiru Valley, many of them ex-farm workers or their children. Some of the Europeans, 
including George Six, had given some of their land to their African workers before abandoning or 
selling their properties in the 1960s (author's interview, commercial farmer, west side of Kiru 
Valley, 19 July 2011). 
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 The government's decision to lease land to the Tanzanian citizens of Asian descent for 
the creation of sugar plantations, and the eviction of squatters that has come with this,  has been 
bitterly contested by the small-scale farmers in the Kiru Valley, who are experiencing acute land 
shortage.  As their families have expanded over time, the land available to them has shrunk. 
Today's large landowners combat encroachment by smallholders and their livestock, sometimes 
using force to evict them and to enclose their plantations.   Small farmers, workers, and the 
landless have attacked the investors and vandalized their properties, burning sugar plantations and 
killing farm owners and managers in the early 1990s, mid-1990s, and in 2011.  Via violence, 
protests, civil disobedience, and the multiparty system, they continue to demand that the 
government terminate the commercial leases and allocate land to them.  The central government 
backs the investors but has not responded forcefully to repress violence and threats against the 
"investors" or and to prevent encroachment on the plantations.  
 In the absence of any claims to customary rights and any institutional infrastructure for 
the development or confirmation of such claims, land-related conflict in this setting has taken the 
form of politicized land-related violence pitting "indigenous Tanzanians" against "outside 
investors" (who are, in this case, mostly non-indigenous Tanzanian citizens). 
 Local politicians have not missed the chance to exploit this conflict for electoral gain.  A 
Chadema candidate for a Babati District seat in the national legislature has sought to represent 
those who are demanding that the government turn over some of the largeholdings to land-poor 
and landless peasants. A Kiru Valley landowner reported that "All the people in Kiru Valley 
voted for Chadema in the elections. The Chadema candidate campaigned on the promise that the 
land would be returned to the people."36  The government, for its part, sent several MPs., 
including the Speaker of Parliament, to Kiru Valley in 2010.  It "promised to resolve the conflict,  
but it has not done so."37  For the most part the government seeks to lay low:  in summer 2011 it 
                         
36 Interview, Babati, July 19,  2011.   
37 Ibid. 
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stationed extra policemen in the Kiru Valley, but declined to pursue aggressively or prosecute the 
local villagers who are accused of farm burnings and of the recent murder of a plantation manager 
of Asian descent.  
 This Tanzanian case provides support for an argument about how land tenure regimes 
shape the scale of politics, the locus of land grievances, and the kinds of identity that are activated 
in making land claims.  Where neocustomary forms of land authority prevail, there is a structural 
disarticulation of local political arenas in which land politics is embedded from the secular 
institutions of the national state. The statist land regimes, by contrast, link rural political 
structures and processes directly into national level institutions and processes.  Institutional 
conditions permit the scaling up of land politics to the national political arena.  And under the 
statist land regime, ethnic identities have little salience in making land claims;  national identities 
-- in the Kiru Valley case, the identity of "black Tanzanian" -- are mobilized to claim land rights.  
Some of the structural and institutional conditions for the incorporation of rural interest groups 
into national-level political processes -- including multiparty politics -- are present under these 
conditions, even if these possibilities are often subverted by the authoritarian practices of rulers. 
 Because of the deeply statist nature of the land regime, most of the political debate about 
land rights in Tanzania centers on the possibility and desirability of democratizing what often 
some see as excessively bureaucratic-authoritarian forms of land administration (see Shivji 1998, 
for example).  The questions of customary rights and ethnic rights that are so high-profile in 
many African cases are muted in Tanzania, appearing most visibly in Tanzania as arguments for 
pastoralists' rights.38  In the 1990s these  were often framed in international-style discourse about 
protecting the rights of indigenous peoples (rather than as ethnic claims per se).  
 
                         
38 A number of studies that have documented  the fragile nature of land rights for the perceived 
ethnic ‘outsiders’ in Tanzania, especially in the case of pastoralists and pastorialist groups who 





 Studies of land politics can reveal variation across African countries in how 
institutionalized political authority works to constitute the scale of politics, define political 
identities, and to institutionalize synergies between formal and informal forms of political 
authority.  Formal and informal power relations often layer and blend in land institutions.  In the 
case of neocustomary land tenure institutions, has happened largely by design, as part and parcel 
of the general construction of colonial and postcolonial indirect rule. "Local states" constituted 
around neocustomary land tenure institutions have worked over time, for the most part, to both 
extend state authority in the countryside and to define the scale and scope of everyday politics in 
ways that work to consolidate ethnic political identities, and to deflect social pressures and 
tensions away from the central state.  Where statist land tenure regimes prevail, more direct forms 
of rule generate different, more secular, political identities, and forms of politics that can expose 
the central state to direct demand-making by mobilized citizens.  This paper illustrates these 
different processes in two situations of resistance and protest against commercial land 
acquisitions.  In significant and observable ways, different forms of land politics in central Ghana 
and northern Tanzania  are traceable to variation in the land tenure institutions that governments 
have constructed very deliberately over time. 
 The main thrust of this paper has been show how established, postcolonial land tenure 
institutions structure and mediate new challenges and conflicts. In reality, however, these new 
pressures and conflicts also work to redefine the institutions themselves (and the political 
relationships around authority, identity, and territory that they encode).  A full analysis of these 
recursive processes lies beyond the scope of this paper, but future scholars will surely be 
compelled to tackle this issue.  The institutionalized political relationships around land that have 
linked smallholders to postcolonial states, and that have produced various forms of political order 
in most of rural Africa for most of the postcolonial era, are now under tremendous strain.  As they 
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crack and give way, new forms of politics will emerge around land. These processes can 
transform the basic structures of state-society relations in Africa. 
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